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Article
Beyond policy positions: How party type
conditions programmatic responses
to globalization pressures
Onawa Promise Lacewell
WZB Berlin Social Science Center, Germany
Abstract
Do parties adapt their programmatic strategies in times of heightened economic globalization? Are these changes
captured by right-left positional changes or do parties go beyond policy shifts and enact more comprehensive
programmatic overhauls? Furthermore, are such changes linked to traditional party family classifications and, if so, do
different party types re-program their manifestos differently? Finally, what role does radical right competition play in
the changing programmatic strategies of mainstream centre-right and centre-left parties? This paper addresses these
questions by developing a theoretical framework that accounts for economic globalization, cleavage change, and
programmatic supply. Using Giebler et al.’s (2015) measure of programmatic clarity, the analysis reveals clear
differences in party responses to economic globalization. Additionally, the results show that parties go beyond right-
left positional changes and adapt their programmatic supply on a more general level. For social democratic parties,
however, such adaptation hinges on whether a radical right competitor is present.
Keywords
comparative politics, party manifestos, political parties
Introduction
Parties are core actors in representative democracies who
forge a crucial representative link between citizens and
governments. Yet there is widespread speculation that par-
ties are failing to fulfil this core democratic function as well
as they once did (Dalton and Wattenberg, 2000). Much of
this failure is attributed to the sluggish way that traditional
parties have responded to ongoing transformations of
Western European societies brought about by continued
globalization, particularly economic globalization, and the
increasing salience of new cleavages (Kriesi et al., 2008,
2012). While there is a consensus that economic globaliza-
tion has affected parties’ strategies somehow, there is less
agreement concerning the exact nature of this effect. Scho-
lars examining links between economic globalization and
shifting party positions focus predominantly on the link
between voters’ preferences and party positional shifts
(Adams et al., 2004; Ezrow et al., 2011) or on how parties
adapt a specific policy stance (e.g. trade policy, see Milner
and Judkins, 2004). Existing research relies heavily on
right-left ideological change to identify and explain shift-
ing party strategies. There is less emphasis on examining
other possible ways that parties can adapt their programma-
tic profiles to account for economic globalization indepen-
dent of positional changes and whether these strategies are
dependent on party type (although recent work by Ward
et al. (2015) and Adams et al. (2009) provides two exam-
ples of work that attempts to remedy these shortcomings).
This article makes three contributions: empirical, meth-
odological, and conceptual. Empirically, the results of the
analysis counter Adams et al.’s (2009) findings concerning
the interaction of left party status and economic globaliza-
tion. While that analysis showed little support for the so-
called ‘‘leftist exceptionalism’’ of left party responses to
globalization pressures (Adams et al., 2009; 630), the cur-
rent analysis does find evidence of left exceptionalism.
Explicitly, the findings of the current analysis show that left
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parties do respond to globalization pressures differently
than other types of parties, but that this response is only sig-
nificant when moderated by the presence of a radical right
competitor.
Methodologically, by applying Giebler et al.’s (2015)
measure of programmatic clarity, the analysis is able to test
how parties from different ideological backgrounds engage
in different types of manifesto reprogramming (Weßels,
2001) in response to heightened levels of economic globa-
lization. Conceptually, two types of reprogramming are
introduced: obscuring and clarifying programmatic supply.
Obscuring occurs when parties’ simultaneously support
both sides of the same issue (i.e. statements both for and
against welfare state spending in the same manifesto) or
simply avoid discussing a policy altogether. Clarifying
occurs when parties stress only one side of a policy issue
in their manifesto. Finally, concerning the role of competi-
tor parties, there is excellent theoretical work discussing the
role of radical right competition in mainstream party strate-
gies and, explicitly, the strategies of social-democratic par-
ties (Bale et al., 2010). Therefore, in a final step, the
analysis tests whether the presence of a radical right com-
petitor affects how social democratic parties adapt their
programmatic strategies.1
The findings reveal significant differences in how party
type conditions a party’s response to heightened economic
globalization independent of, although possibly in addition
to, right-left positional changes. Specifically, the analysis
shows that left parties obscure their programmatic stances
when economic globalization increases and clarifywhen eco-
nomic globalization decreases. However, non-left parties
rarely adapt their programmatic supply in the face of chang-
ing levels of economic globalization and, for this group, eco-
nomic globalization has little effect on the clarity of their
manifestos. Finally, the results reveal clear differences
between the programmatic responses of social democratic
parties facing radical right competitors and that of social dem-
ocratic parties running in elections where no radical right
party is present. When social democratic parties face radical
right competition they significantly obscure their program-
matic supply, but when there is no radical right party compe-
titor social democratic parties opt to clarify their positions.
Toward a comprehensive theoretical
framework: Economic globalization,
cleavages, and parties
Research on economic globalization and political parties
typically adopts one of two perspectives: a political eco-
nomic perspective or a political parties perspective, that,
until very recently at least, followed the general pattern of
two ships passing in the night.2 Most party scholars approach
the problem from the direction of cleavages, explore how
globalization affects the traditional Rokkanian cleavage
space, and, in a next step, examine how the decreased sal-
ience of traditional cleavages affects party transformation
and the strategies parties adopt to deal with these changes.
A smaller subset of scholars approaches the question from
a political economy perspective. While these scholars also
examine how party strategies change, they begin with the
assumption that globalization, and specifically the shifting
economic paradigm from the Keynesian phase that charac-
terized the period directly following WWII toward neoliber-
alism beginning in the 1960s and 1970s, pressured parties on
both the left and right to adapt their traditional policy
stances. Of key importance is that while the two perspectives
may differ in their starting points (i.e. cleavages or the econ-
omy), the predictions they make concerning how parties
adapt their strategies are similar. What is needed, then, is a
comprehensive theoretical framework that links globaliza-
tion and changing party programmatic strategies with what
we know of the root causes of party decline and transforma-
tion—namely, the changing nature of cleavage structures.
Globalization: Shifting economic paradigms
and changing party strategies
Held et al. (1999) conceptualize globalization as an
ongoing process that has, in the post-war era until today,
increased significantly in terms of both intensity and velo-
city. According to Held et al., the contemporary period
of economic globalization began during the 1960s and
1970s and marked the end of the Bretton Woods era that
had been in place since the signing of that agreement in
1944 (Held et al., 1999: 201). In terms of party politics, the
Bretton Woods period was characterized by high national
autonomy and, in general, the popularity of Keynesian eco-
nomic policies (Kitschelt et al., 1999: 200–201) within
(often Social Democratic) national governments and gov-
erning coalitions (Kitschelt et al., 1999; Przeworski and
Sprague, 1986). Conversely, the perceived failure of
Keynesian economic policies led to two outcomes: neoli-
beralism and renewed attempts to further European integra-
tion (Kitschelt et al., 1999: 6).
It is during this same period that the story of party
decline and party transformation begins. Shifts in the domi-
nant economic paradigm were mirrored by the end of the
‘‘Golden Age’’ of political parties (Reiter, 1989) and here,
too, left parties were seen as the biggest losers (Bartolini,
2007; Brooks, 1983). This makes sense as the Golden Age
of parties was, similar to the Bretton Woods era, dominated
by social democratic-led governments supporting and
implementing Keynesian economic policies (Kitschelt
et al., 1999). Nevertheless, while the party transformation
and decline literature surely acknowledges the role of shift-
ing economic paradigms, the real emphasis is on the
decreasing salience of traditional cleavages (Duverger,
1963; Katz and Mair, 1995; Kirchheimer, 1965; Kitschelt,
1995; Mair, 1997).
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Beyond citizens: Parties as winners and losers
of (economic) globalization
The class cleavage outlined by Lipset and Rokkan (1967)
was primarily an economic cleavage that pitted the interests
of workers against owners and ‘‘proved more uniformly
divisive’’ than the other three cleavages identified by
Lipset and Rokkan’s work (Bartolini and Mair, 2007:
60). However, the changing nature of societies saw the
rapid disappearance and decline of traditional left (i.e.
worker) constituencies (Kitschelt et al., 1999; Przeworski
and Sprague, 1986) and an increased salience of post-
materialist issues (Ingelhart, 1977). While globalization
has generally led to a restructuring of the traditional Eur-
opean political space (Kriesi et al., 2008), not all European
societies and/or voting constituencies were equally affected
by these changes and not all parties responded in the same
way. Instead, just as we can conceptualize the ‘‘winners
and losers’’ of globalization on an individual level
(cf. Kriesi et al., 2008, 2012), we can also conceptualize
parties of certain ideological backgrounds as ‘‘winners’’
and ‘‘losers’’ of this process (Burgoon, 2012). Explicitly,
the rise of economic globalization is directly linked to a
shift in parties’ positions on social policies, especially
welfare state policies (Boix, 1998), and here the findings
clearly suggest that social democratic parties and conser-
vative parties take very different approaches when com-
pensating for globalization pressures (Boix, 1998). If
social democratic parties were the clear losers, as much
of the literature suggests (Bartolini, 2007; Merkel et al.,
2008; Przeworski and Sprague, 1986), due in large part
to the fact that they ‘‘disproportionally represent those
facing globalization’s risks’’ (Burgoon, 2012: 607), then
party families whose economic profiles were more
aligned with neoliberal ideologies, such as Liberal parties
and Christian Democratic or Conservative parties, should
be the winners (Burgoon, 2012).3
Another beneficiary of the post-Bretton Woods era and
the declining salience of traditional cleavages were the
non-mainstream parties, and studies show that new par-
ties—usually in the form of radical right or extreme right
populist parties—and niche parties (Bornschier, 2010;
Meguid, 2005; Wagner, 2012) benefitted from these socie-
tal changes over their mainstream counterparts. While tra-
ditional parties maintained their ties to the class cleavage,
an ever-growing group of citizens no longer shared these
ties (Dalton, 2000). There are clear indications from the
theoretical literature that the presence of radical right con-
tenders (and to some extent radical left contenders (Bale,
2003)) affects the strategies of mainstream parties (Bale,
2003, 2010), and most recent findings from the empirical
literature confirm that niche party competition affects
mainstream party strategies (van der Wardt, 2015; Meyer
and Wagner, 2013). Therefore, ecology and nationalist
party families fall solidly into the ‘‘winners of economic
globalization’’ camp. Likewise, it is important to note that
not all countries were similarly affected by the shift toward
neoliberalism and increasing economic globalization.4
Taking together findings from the economic globaliza-
tion literature and the party transformation and decline
literature, we can formulate a clear set of predictions con-
cerning how different party families should be differently
affected by rapidly increasing economic globalization.
Specifically, we have clear reasons to suspect that tradi-
tional left-of-center parties, namely Social Democratic and
Socialist parties, should be the most negatively affected.
Liberal parties, on the other hand, should be the clear win-
ners of these changes while Christian Democratic and
Conservative parties should also be clear beneficiaries,
albeit to a lesser extent than Liberal parties. Finally, while
it is possible to conceptualize winners and losers of eco-
nomic globalization within the context of traditional,
mainstream party families, the party transformation and
decline literature makes clear that another classification
is also possible: between traditional, mainstream parties
(i.e. the losers) and non-traditional, new, and/or niche par-
ties (i.e. the winners).
Party strategies: Responses to economic
globalization and cleavage change
Recent work connecting shifts in party strategies explicitly
to economic globalization focuses on change in overall
ideological positions as evidenced by shifts in right-left
positions (Adams et al., 2004, 2006; Ezrow et al., 2011;
Schumacher et al., 2013), hereafter RILE. However, ideo-
logical change is not the only type of programmatic change
that parties can make. Recently, more scholars have begun
to move away from explanations that focus solely on posi-
tional changes (De Vries and Hobolt, 2012; Rovny, 2012;
Ward et al., 2015) and instead include explanations
stressing how parties emphasize some issues over others
(Kluever and Spoon, 2015; Ward et al., 2015), blur their
positions on certain issues (Rovny, 2012), or change the
number of dimensions on which they compete (de Vries
and Hobolt, 2012). Such work shows the importance of
moving away from only focusing on right-left positional
changes in order to conceptualize programmatic change.
The theoretical framework proposed here relies on Weßels’
(2001) concept of Umprogrammierung, or ‘reprogram-
ming’ of party manifestos and policy positions.
The concept of reprogramming is closely related to
Rovny’s (2012) work on issue blurring versus issue empha-
sis. He argues, on the basis of recent findings about the
effect of multidimensionality on party strategies (De Vries
and Marks, 2012), that under certain conditions—explicitly
ones of increasing dimensionality of competition—posi-
tional blurring may be a beneficial strategy. This strategy,
according to Rovny, will be most beneficial to parties for
450 Party Politics 23(4)
whom an important issue dimension crosscuts the prefer-
ences of their constituency or where ‘‘the party is especially
hard pressed to amalgamate the disparate views on the
[crosscutting] dimension’’ (Rovny, 2012: 274). By all indi-
cations, globalization has increased the dimensionality of
political competition (de Vries and Hobolt, 2012) as well
as changed the foundational underpinnings of these dimen-
sions (Hooghe et al., 2002; Kriesi et al., 2008, 2012) and
has proven to be a crosscutting issue for traditional left-
of-center party constituencies but not for Liberal and
right-of-center party constituencies. Unlike Rovny’s con-
ceptualization, though, the concept of reprogramming as
Weßels conceives it is much broader than simple positional
shifts or than blurring positions on a single issue dimension.
Instead, reprogramming constitutes a near-complete over-
haul of a party’s program and can be thought of as a more
general structural change to a party’s programmatic supply.
Obscuring
The obscuring strategy occurs when parties deemphasize
an existing issue/policy position or even ignore some issues
all together. Opting for this strategy means that parties
decrease the clarity of their programmatic supply. This
‘watering down’ of the manifesto will not necessarily take
into account new issues (although this is certainly possible,
too) so much as offer less clear stances on traditional pro-
grammatic policies. While it is clearly possible that parties
will moderate their overall ideological positions (i.e. right-
left positional changes), it is also possible that parties will
choose to water down their programmatic offerings in ways
not fully captured by RILE and/or in addition to RILE
positional shifts. It is important to note that, theoreti-
cally, the expectation is that parties will engage in this
strategy intentionally with the expectation that such a
strategy will be helpful. In this way, obscuring, like
Rovny’s position blurring differs from the unintentional
ambiguity of candidate positions much lamented in
American politics research (Alvarez, 1998) and from the
ambiguity of policy positions that results from infighting
among party elites (Rovny, 2012). Parties can obscure
programmatic supply via two methods: first, they can
address both pro and con sides of a policy (e.g. welfare
state policies); secondly, they can simply de-emphasize
issues where there is no clear constituency preference
by not mentioning these issues in their manifestos. The
measure discussed below—the programmatic clarity
index—captures both possibilities.
Given the above discussion about how globalization cre-
ates party family winners and losers, the first expectation is
that parties belonging to left-of-center Social Democratic
and Socialist party families will engage in an obscuring
strategy as the level of economic globalization increases
(H1). Additionally, Bale et al. (2010) predict that social
democratic parties especially will be threatened by radical
right competitors. Specifically, they expect that radical
right parties ‘‘own’’ issues that ‘‘command broad support
across Western European electorates’’ such as immigration;
and that these electorates—namely the lower educated
working class—were those that traditionally formed the
basis of social democratic support (Bale et al., 2010:
411), thereby crosscutting the traditional social democratic
constituencies. Therefore, it is expected that social demo-
cratic parties who are facing a radical right competitor may
make different strategic decisions in adapting their pro-
grammatic supply than those parties who do not face a
radical right competitor (H2).
Clarifying
Those parties not tied to constituencies that were not cross-
cut by globalization related issues may find it more fruitful
to make clear their manifesto positions rather than follow
an obscuring strategy as they still benefit from clarity
regarding their constituencies’ interests. This strategy
should be especially attractive to the winners of globaliza-
tion—namely Liberal parties and, to a lesser extent, right-
of-center Christian Democratic and Conservative parties
whose traditional policy stances are complemented by a
neoliberal economic paradigm —who should choose to
clarify their existing manifesto positions as the level of eco-
nomic globalization increases (H3).
Data, modelling specifics,
and operationalization
The data is structured so that each party represents a panel
(total ¼ 142). Observations are parties in a given election
(N ¼ 847) ranging between 1970 and 2009. The nature
of the data structure (parties nested in countries and
elections) clearly lends itself to a multi-level modelling
approach and, indeed, this was the first model tested for this
analysis. However, very low ICC levels (0.01 for the party
level and 0.001 for the country level) revealed no justifica-
tion for applying such a model, and a subsequent test of a
time series regression with fixed versus random effects
confirmed that there was little need for a fixed effects
modelling approach based on the non-significance of the
Hausman test. Still, given the panel structure of the data,
there is a theoretical reason to suspect that the standard
errors will have panel-specific first-order autocorrelation
and controlling for this is necessary. Therefore, the mod-
els reported below are all time series regression models
with panel corrected standard errors (Beck and Katz,
1995). The time series component of the model is calcu-
lated by the first election for a country in the dataset and
then a running number from that point forward. For exam-
ple, if a country has five elections included in the data set
the time variable will range from 1 to 5 and does not
depend on year or election date, which would leave gaps
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in the time series.5 However, despite the calculation of the
time variable, there remains an unbalanced panel structure
(not all parties run in all elections) which necessitates a
forced pairwise case inclusion.6
Given that the real phenomenon of interest is whether
and how parties change their strategies, all variables have
been calculated into change variables. This makes inter-
pretation of the results less straightforward, but concep-
tually such a choice is justified. As we are also
interested in long-term rather than short-term change, the
change variables are calculated as the change between
three election periods: t, t-1, and t-2. Three election peri-
ods were selected as this represents, for the majority of the
sample, approximately a 10-year period of change. The
calculation takes the sum of the difference between t and
t-1 and the difference between t-1 and t-2, thereby
smoothing out large short-term variations. The descriptive
statistics for the variables used in the models below are
shown inTable 1. Figure 1 shows the temporal variation in the
economic globalization variable for each country. Figure 2
shows the bivariate scatterplot of the programmatic clarity
index (the DV) and the economic globalization variable (the
main IV) and provides a linear fit line for left parties and non-
left parties.
Dependent variable: Programmatic clarity
The programmatic clarity index (PCI), developed by Gie-
bler et al. (2015), provides a way to examine the level of
clarity of parties’ programmatic supply based on how many
times they mention either the pro or con position of a spe-
cific policy issue in their electoral manifesto. The measure
uses data from the Manifesto Project (Volkens et al., 2012).
The Manifesto Project coding scheme includes 56 policy
categories of which 26 (13 matched pairs) are antipodal
positional categories—meaning one positive and one nega-
tive policy category (e.g. ‘‘Welfare State: Positive’’ and
‘‘Welfare State’’ Negative’’ (Werner et al., 2011)).7 Giebler
et al. (2015) begin with the assumption that parties with
clear programmatic supply will consistently stress one side
or the other of an issue rather than stressing both. Parties
who wish to obscure their positions will include statements
Table 1. Descriptive statistics and sample overview.
Continuous variablesa
Mean Std. Dev Min Max
D Programmatic Clarity (DV) 0.025 0.187 –0.696 0.774
D Vote Share (%) –0.28 5.479 –28.02 34.50
D Right-Left Position
(min ¼ left; max ¼ right)
0.977 18.65 –73.78 76.58
D Economic Globalization 5.695 4.749 –3.99 20.53
Categorical Variables
Left 0 ¼ Not Left (baseline)
1 ¼ Left
541
307
Mainstream 0 ¼ Not Mainstream (baseline)
1 ¼ Left
2 ¼ Liberal
3 ¼ Right
211
307
122
208
Social Democrats and Radical Right Parties (RRPs) 0 ¼ Not–Social Democrat (baseline)
1 ¼ Social Democrat/No RRP Competitor
2 ¼ Social Democrat/RRP Competitor
652
125
71
Country Sweden (baseline)
Denmark
Finland
Belgium
Netherlands
Luxembourg
France
Italy
Spain
Greece
Portugal
Germany
Austria
Switzerland
Great Britain
Sampling Information
Obs(Party/Election) N ¼ 847 Time Running count from election 1 for each country
N ¼ 215
T ¼ 19
Gaps: 10
Years: 1970–2009
Panel (Party) N ¼ 142 (min ¼ 1, avg ¼ 6, max ¼ 13)
a All change variables calculated as D ¼ (t – t1) þ (t1 – t2).
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addressing both sides of the issue or will refrain from
addressing the issue at all. Recall that the concept of repro-
gramming encompasses a broad change in programmatic
supply that is not related solely to changes in economic
policy positions despite the theoretical importance of eco-
nomic globalization. Therefore, the PCI is particularly well
suited for this analysis as it includes not only economic pol-
icies but provides a more all-encompassing measure of pro-
grammatic change on social and cultural issues as well thus
allowing for a direct test of the theoretical prediction that
economic globalization affects the reprogramming of the
entire manifesto and not only a subset of it.8
The technical calculation of the PCI is given in the
Appendix as well as in Giebler et al. (2015). On a more
general level though, the PCI is an election-specific mea-
sure and the calculation starts first with the calculation of
a party’s relative size to other parties (via vote shares) in
a given election so as not to bias small parties.9 Then, 26
categories are rescaled so that the sum of all positive cate-
gories and all negative categories is equal to 1. Next, this
sum is weighted by the relative measure of a party’s size
in the election so as not to bias small parties (who are
expected to have less ‘catch-all’ manifestos) and if the
party does not mention the policy area at all in the mani-
festo the weight is set to zero. The programmatic clarity
index (PCI), then, is the grand sum of the absolute differ-
ence of positive and negative mentions of a party in a given
election divided by the sum of positive and negative men-
tions multiplied by the previously calculated weight. The
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Figure 1. Mean change in economic globalization across time and country.
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Figure 2. Bivariate relationship between economic globalization
change and change in programmatic clarity.
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final index runs from 0 (completely obscure program) to 1
(completely clear program).
Independent variables
Party family classifications. The analysis consists of three
separate models. The variables for each model remain the
same, except the party family variable. Three separate party
type variables are calculated, and all are based on the party
family groupings found in the Manifesto Data. First, a
dummy variable for left-of-center party was created using
the party family classifications of the Manifesto Project
dataset and is used in Model 1. Left-of-center parties are
social democratic and socialist/communist parties as
defined by the Manifesto Project party family classification
(which is based on International Party Family member-
ship). All parties not designated as Social Democratic,
Socialist, or Communist by the Manifesto Project are clas-
sified as non-left parties. This binary classification yields
307 left-of-center parties and 542 non-left parties in the
sample. Model 2 then includes a second, broadened party
family variable which, also based on the Manifesto party
family classification, codes whether a party is: a) Social
Democratic/Socialist/Communist, b) Liberal, c) Conserva-
tive/Christian Democratic, or b) non-Mainstream. Finally,
and based on the explicit predictions that social democratic
parties will behave differently contingent on radical right
party competition, Model 3 recodes the party family vari-
able into a three-part categorical variable for Social Demo-
crats and Radica Right Parties (RRPs) which provides
information on whether a party is a) a social democratic
party with a RRP competitor or b) a social democratic party
without a RRP competitor. The variable is calculated
exactly in such a two-step process and the zero category rep-
resents non-social democratic parties and is used as the base-
line category.10
Economic globalization. The key independent variable is a
measure of change in economic globalization. As a sys-
tem level variable, economic globalization is a constant
across all parties within a national party system but the
effects clearly vary across countries (cf. Merkel et al.,
2008: 16–17).11 The variable is measured with the KOF
index of globalization (Dreher, 2006; Dreher et al.,
2008) using the economic globalization measure pro-
vided as part of the dataset.12 Economic globalization
is defined as ‘‘long distance flows of goods, capital, and
services as well as information and perceptions that
accompany market exchanges’’ (KOF, 2013: 1). The
index is a compilation of data from several sources and
is created by combining actual trade flows and restric-
tions on trade. For more information, see Dreher
(2006) or Dreher et al. (2008). The reasons for only
including economic globalization are twofold. First, as
discussed previously, previous work has led to clear
predictions as to how economic globalization should
affect party positions. Second, despite the focus solely
on Western European countries, there are still differences
in how individual national governments responded to the
demands of the ‘contemporary era’ and, thus, there is still
variance in the level of economic globalization—some-
thing that is not true for political globalization where var-
iance in the KOF data is minimal.13 The change in
economic globalization variable is truncated14 to range
from –4 to 22, so there is not only ample variation but,
importantly, there are also a few cases (albeit a relatively
small number) where the change in economic globaliza-
tion is actually negative (see Figure 1).
Interaction terms. Finally, the models include several inter-
action terms to account for the conditional nature of the
theory. First, I predict that the effect of economic globali-
zation on programmatic clarity is moderated by whether a
party is a left party or not. Therefore, an interaction
between left party and change in economic globalization
is included. The second model includes a similar interac-
tion between mainstream party type and change in eco-
nomic globalization while the third model includes an
interaction between social democratic party with or with-
out radical right competition and change in economic
globalization.
Control variables. As discussed previously, current research
points to a clear link between increasing levels of glo-
balization and right-left positional changes (Adams et
al., 2009; Ezrow and Hellwig, 2014; Haupt, 2010; Ward
et al., 2011). However, this analysis is concerned with
changes to programmatic clarity separate from such
right-left shifts and therefore change in RILE position
is a control variable only. Like the programmatic clarity
index, the RILE index includes 26 categories—13 Right
and 13 Left. Of these 26 categories, only half overlap
with categories also included in the programmatic
clarity index. However, while there is 50% overlap in
categories, only three of the 13 pairs included in the
programmatic clarity calculation are also found (as
pairs) in the RILE index. Furthermore, it is also
expected, given the findings of Adams, Haupt, Ward
and others, that there is an interaction between RILE
and increasing economic globalization levels. There-
fore, a second interaction between economic globaliza-
tion levels and programmatic clarity, change in
economic globalization and change in right-left posi-
tion, is included in the model as a control variable.
Finally, in lieu of controlling for several possibly coun-
try specific indicators such as SMD vs PR and the level
of affluence of a country, the models all include country
dummies. These dummies control for such country spe-
cific variation.
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Results
Table 2 presents results for all three models. On a general
level, the analysis provides only partial evidence for H1
and H3, but H2—concerning the effect of radical right par-
ties on social democratic strategies—is confirmed.
Concerning H1, that left parties will adopt an obscuring
strategy in the face of rising economic globalization, the
results of Model 1 are straightforward. The interaction
between left party and globalization shows that at increasing
levels of changing economic globalization left parties do sig-
nificantly obscure their programs. The overall programmatic
clarity of left parties (as shown in Figure 3) begins near the
maximum level but, as the change in economic globalization
variable increases from theminimum tomaximum level, pro-
grammatic clarity of left parties drops quite drastically. For
non-left parties, however, there is little change in programma-
tic clarity as changing economic globalization becomes
greater.While the coefficient for the left*change in economic
globalizationvariable ismarginally significant as reported for
Model 1 (p¼ 0.06), it is important to note that the full story
shown by the marginal effects in Figure 3 changes the inter-
pretation somewhat. Here we see that the significance of this
variable is actually at the mean level of economic globaliza-
tion change and below. This means that left parties who pro-
duced programs in times where the changes in economic
globalization were just beginning were also the parties
who significantly obscured their programmatic supply. The
mean level significance, while interesting, also shows no
significant difference between left and non-left parties at
this point. The real driver here seems to be when economic
globalization increases from below average levels to aver-
age levels—at least for the binary left/not-left comparison.
When the left/not-left variable is instead recoded into a
mainstream left, liberal, right versus non-mainstream cate-
gorical variable in Model 2, we see further differences
between the party types—even if the main interaction terms
fail to reach statistical significance.15 However, the general
direction of the coefficients conforms to the theoretical
expectation that Liberal parties clarify their programmatic
supply when facing increasing levels of economic globaliza-
tion, contrasting to the tendency of left parties to obscure.
Charitably, one could argue that such a result offers at least
partial support for H3: the one party family, the Liberals, for
whom globalization supports the traditional programmatic
Table 2. Prais-Winsten TSCS regression with panel corrected standard errors.
Model 1a, b Model 2 Model 3
bc s.e.d b s.e. b s.e.
Intercept 0.056y 0.029 0.070** 0.030 0.060** 0.028
D Right-Left Position –0.002** 0.001 –0.002** 0.001 –0.002*** 0.001
D Economic Globalization –0.000 0.002 –0.001 0.002 –0.002 0.002
Left
Left 0.018 0.020
Mainstream
Left 0.002 0.025
Liberal –0.040 0.033
Right –0.011 0.025
Social Democrats & RRPs
Social Democrat/No RRP Competition 0.045y 0.024
Social Democrat/RRP Competition –0.072* 0.036
Left * D Economic Globalization
Left –0.005y 0.003
Mainstream * D Economic Globalization
Left –0.004 0.003
Liberal 0.010 0.005
Right –0.003 0.003
Social Democrats & RRPs * D Economic Globalization
Social Democrat/No RRP Competition 0.001y 0.003
Social Democrat/RRP Competition –0.012** 0.004
D Right-Left Position * D Economic Globalization –0.00** 0.00 –0.000** 0.000 –0.000* 0.000
r 0.070 0.034 0.035 0.035 0.08 0.033
df 20 24 22
R2 0.1306 0.1344 0.1371
w2 105.86*** 110.18*** 117.10***
N 847 847 847
aFor All Models: DV¼ D Programmatic Clarity; bFor All Models: Country dummies not shown for clarity; cy p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001;
dAll models include control for panel-specific AR1 correlation (142 estimated autocorrelations).
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profile clarifies their programmatic supply in contrast to
those parties for whom globalization directly counters tradi-
tional programmatic offerings.
Turning to the final model, the results are very much as
expected: social democratic parties facing a radical right
competitor under conditions of rapidly increasing eco-
nomic globalization significantly obscure their program-
matic profiles while social democratic parties where no
radical right competitor is present clarify, although not
significantly, their programmatic supply. Figure 4 shows
the marginal effects of the change in economic globaliza-
tion on a party’s programmatic clarity conditioned by
whether the party was a social democratic party facing a
radical right competitor or a social democratic party with-
out a radical right competitor. Under conditions of below
average changes in economic globalization and at the
highest levels of change in economic globalization, social
democratic parties facing radical right competitors also
differ significantly from other social democratic parties
that do not have such competition.
Discussion
The analysis presented here tests the extent to which parties
adapt their programmatic supply—either by obscuring or
clarifying it—in the face of changing levels of economic
globalization, as an additional or alternate strategy to
well-researched positional changes. Using an innovative
measure of programmatic clarity, the results show that left
parties—namely social democratic or socialist/communist
parties—are affected differently by increasing levels of
economic globalization, and that these parties respond by
obscuring their programmatic positions. This is exactly
what we would expect for a party whose traditional core
policy profile is undermined by the shift to a neoliberal eco-
nomic paradigm and, additionally, by a party whose core
constituency is no longer sufficient to guarantee electoral
success. Generally, the assumption of both the economic
globalization literature and the party transformation litera-
ture—that left parties receive a lion’s share of the pressures
arising from economic globalization—is largely confirmed
by the findings. Going a step further, the narrow focus on
social democratic parties only, as used in the third model,
and the findings from that model, confirm the expectations
of Bale et al. (2010) and others that these parties in partic-
ular are facing a dual threat: first, changing economic glo-
balization threatens the underlying core principles of their
traditional policy stances and, secondly, radical right com-
petitors also cause social democratic parties to obscure
their programmatic supply.
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Figure 3. Marginal effects of left party status on programmatic clarity given globalization change.
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While the results largely support the basic assumptions
outlined in the theory section, they also show that the
relationship between traditional ideological underpinnings
and reprogramming due to globalization pressures is not
straightforward and that there is a clear need to extend the
analysis even more. Further analyses could fruitfully focus
on including a variety of additional variables in the model.
In particular, the inclusion of the Index of Party Cohesion
(IPC) of Jahn and Oberst (2012: 225), which measures the
‘ideological spread of a party", would allow for the explo-
ration of whether obscuring strategies are also, in part,
linked to what are essentially disagreements within the
party concerning the party’s right-left ideological profile.
The premise of such a comparison would be that those
parties facing greater internal strife should obscure their
programmatic supply more so than when there is higher
internal agreement between party elites.
More broadly, the results are important in terms of elec-
toral competition as it seems that parties are adapting their
programmatic supply in ways that are, at the very least, not
completely captured by right-left positional changes. While
the models presented here treat right-left positional changes
as control variables only, the continued significance of
these variables in the models suggest that these changes are
important to the broader picture, and future analysis should
work on combining both positional changes and changes
in programmatic clarity in the same model. Finally, these
findings carry implications outside the field of party scho-
larship, as the natural continuation of the research should
examine voter responses to such adaptations and the extent
to which the concepts of reprogramming and programmatic
clarity influence overall patterns of electoral competition
in the rapidly changing landscape of Western European
societies.
Appendix: Calculation of programmatic
clarity
The measure of programmatic clarity is developed by Gie-
bler et al. (2015).
The index begins by calculating the election-specific
relative measure of party size (RMPS):
RMPSik ¼
Xnk
jk¼1
voteshareik
votesharejk
 1Xnk
ik¼1
Xnk
jk¼1
voteshareik
votesharejk
 1
 
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Figure 4. Marginal effect of radical right competition on social democratic parties’ reprogramming.
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where i is party, k is election, n is the total number of
parties competing in the election, and j is a running number
(1–n). This ranges from 0 to 1.
Once the RMPS is created, the index is built in three
steps. First, the 26 policy categories (forming the 13 pairs)
are rescaled so that:
Xn
j¼1
areaposijk þ
Xn
j¼1
areanegijk ¼ 1
Where n is the total policy categories, j is each individ-
ual policy category, i represents each party, and k repre-
sents each election. This is then weighted by the relative
measure of party size in order to control for saliency of
issues in a given election:
Wjk ¼
Xn
i¼1
ðareaposjk þ areanegjkÞ RMPSik
For Wjk, if a party does not mention a policy area in the
manifesto, then the weight of the policy area is zero. Once
the weights are calculated, this is combined to create the
final programmatic clarity measure :
PCik ¼
Xn
j¼1
jareaposijk  areanegijk j
areaposijk þ areanegijk
Wjk
 !
Where n is the total number of policy areas, j represents
the individual policy area, i is for party, and k stands
for election. The final measure runs from 0 (completely
obscure program) to 1 (perfectly clear program which only
includes one antipode per policy area).
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Notes
1. It is important to point out that this research does not focus on
voters. Clearly, the voter-party dynamic and changes to voter
constellations are part of the larger story surrounding the
transformation of party competition in Western Europe.
However, as a first step, the remainder of this work rooted
firmly in a discussion of party strategies and party program-
matic supply. Such a focus is justified because, according
to cleavage theory, social divisions in societies only become
political cleavages once they are mobilized by political
parties (or other organizational actors) (Deegan-Krause,
2007; Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; Mair, 2005).
2. Kitschelt already points to the lack of overlap between the
two literatures in 1999, but only in the late 2000s did scholars
such as Haupt (2010) and Ward et al. (2011) start making real
headway with developing comprehensive theoretical frame-
works that accounted for both political-economic pressures
on the one hand and electoral competition on the other and
then testing them empirically.
3. Conservative parties also suffered during this period as they
attempted to find policies ‘‘that promote economic growth
as effectively as the policies of state interventionism did dur-
ing the post-war decades’’ (Kitschelt et al., 1999). There is lit-
tle doubt, though, that conservative parties had an easier time
incorporating neoliberal economic policies into their existing
programmatic profiles (Adams et al., 2009).
4. There are of course alternative explanations for such socio-
structural changes, including the increase of post-materialism
(Ingelhart, 1977) and of GAL-TAN issues (Hooghe et al.,
2002) along with the rise of new politics issues (Poguntke,
2014).
5. This is methodologically and theoretically justified as elec-
tions, not years, give parties the opportunity to change their
manifestos.
6. The assumption of the model is that a party’s programmatic
clarity at time t1 will be correlated with the programmatic
clarity of the party at t0 and it is further assumed that this
autocorrelation is panel specific. This means that that the
clarity of Party A’s manifesto at time t1 will be dependent
of the clarity of the manifesto at time t0, but it is not assumed
that the programmatic clarity of Party A at t1 will be corre-
lated with the programmatic clarity of Party B t1 or t0, the
party system’s mean clarity at t1 or t0, and so on. Therefore,
the models include panel specific AR1 controls as well as
controls for within panel heteroskedasticity (panel specific
het-corrected standard errors).
7. Antipodal category pairs included in the programmatic clarity
calculation are: Foreign Special Relationshipþ/-, Militaryþ/-,
European Union þ/-, Internationalism þ/-, Constitutional-
ism þ/-, Political Centralization þ/-, Economic Protection-
ism þ/-, Welfare State þ/-, Education þ/-, National Way of
Life þ/-, Traditional Morality þ/-, Multiculturalism þ/-,
and Labor Groups þ/-.
8. While economic issues and the economic left-right were the
main structuring forces underlying party positions in earlier
times, the new globalization-related cleavage(s) emphasize both
economic and cultural issues (Kriesi et al., 2008, 2012); such a
shift is not problematic for the index as it is an election-
specific measure. This means that the salience of an issue in one
election is not linked to the salience of the same issue in the pre-
vious election(s). Therefore, if changing cleavage structures
causes some issues to becomemore salient and some less salient
over time, such changes will not alone lead to more obscuring.
9. Small parties may only focus on one or two highly salient
issues in their programs while larger catch-all style parties
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may talk about a wider range of issues. However, simply
because the smaller party fails to include a position on all
13 policy areas does not mean that they have an unclear pro-
gram generally, as they may be very clear on a single issue.
Therefore the relative measure of party size ensures that the
measure is not biased toward these small parties that address
a few highly salient, election-specific issues with high clarity.
10. Both the Austrian Freedom Party and also the Norwegian
FRP were recoded into the nationalist party family.
11. While it is true that the level of globalization will be
constant for all countries, and therefore all parties, it is
important to note that this is not to say that all parties are
equally affected by globalization. Clearly those parties more
closely tied to the traditional economic right-left dimension
will more keenly feel the pressures of the changing eco-
nomic paradigm/globalization than will parties who are less
tied to this dimension.
12. http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/
13. In fact, the KOF index of globalization used in the analysis
includes economic, political, and social globalization mea-
sures. For the European democracies included in the analysis,
however, only the economic globalization variable yields
enough variation across countries to allow for statistical
testing.
14. This was the case of the Spanish Andalusian party which is
only in the dataset in the earliest years and the latest years.
15. Given the non-significance of the key party family coeffi-
cients, the marginal effects plots are excluded.
References
Adams J, Clark M, Ezrow L, et al. (2004) Understanding change
and stability in party ideologies: Do parties respond to public
opinion or to past election results? British Journal of Political
Science 34(4): 589–610.
Adams J, Clark M, Ezrow L, et al. (2006) Are niche parties fun-
damentally different from mainstream parties? The causes and
the electoral consequences of Western European parties’ pol-
icy shifts, 1976–1998. American Journal of Political Science
50(3): 513–529.
Adams J, Haupt AB and Stoll H (2009) What moves parties? The
role of public opinion and global economic conditions in
Western Europe. Comparative Political Studies 42(5): 611–
639.
Alvarez RM (1998) Information and Elections. Ann Arbor, MI:
University of Michigan Press.
Bale T (2003) Cinderella and her ugly sisters: The mainstream
and extreme right in Europe’s bipolarizing party systems.West
European Politics 26(3): 67–90.
Bale T, Green-Pederson C, Krouwel A, et al. (2010) If you can’t
beat them, join them? Explaining social democratic responses
to the challenge from the populist radical right in Western Eur-
ope. Political Studies 58(3): 410–426.
Bartolini S (2007) The Political Mobilization of the European
Left, 1860–1980: The Class Cleavage. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Bartolini S and Mair P (2007) Identity, Competition, and Elec-
toral Availability: The Stabilisation of European Electorates
1885–1985. Colchester: ECPR Press.
Beck N and Katz JN (1995) What to do (and not do) with time-
series cross-sectional data. American Political Science Review
89(3): 634–647.
Boix C (1998) Political Parties, Growth and Equality: Conserva-
tive and Social Democratic Strategies in the World Economy.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bornschier S (2010) Cleavage Politics and the Populist Right:
The New Cultural Conflict in Western Europe. Philadelphia,
PA: Temple University Press.
Brooks JE (1983) Left-wing mobilization and socioeconomic
equality: A cross-national analysis of the developed democra-
cies. Comparative Political Studies 16(3): 393–416.
Burgoon B (2012) Partisan embedding of liberalism: How
trade, investment, and immigration affect party support
for the welfare state. Comparative Political Studies 45(5):
606–635.
Dalton RJ (2000) The decline of party identifications. In: Dalton
RJ and Wattenberg MP (eds) Parties Without Partisans: Polit-
ical Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, pp. 19–43.
Dalton RJ and Wattenberg MP (2000) Parties without Partisans:
Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
de Vries C and S Hobolt (2012) When dimensions collide: The
electoral success of issue entrepreneurs. European Union
Politics 13(2): 246–268.
de Vries C and Marks G (2012) The struggle over dimensionality:
A note on theory and empirics. European Union Politics 13(2):
185–193.
Deegan-Krause K (2007) New dimensions of political cleavage.
In: Dalton RJ and Klingemann H-D (eds) The Oxford Hand-
book of Political Behavior. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
pp. 538–556.
Dreher A (2006) KOF Index of Globalization. Zu¨rich: Konjunk-
turforschungsstelle ETH Zu¨rich.
Dreher A, Gaston N and Martin P (2008) Measuring Globaliza-
tion: Gauging its Consequences. New York: Springer Press.
Duverger M (1963) Political Parties: Their Organization and
Activity in the Modern State. New York: Wiley.
Ezrow L and Hellwig T (2014) Responding to voters or
responding to markets? Political parties and public opinion
in an era of globalization. International Studies Quarterly
58(4): 816–827.
Ezrow L, De Vries C, Steenbergen M, et al. (2011) Mean voter
representation and partisan constituencies representation: Do
parties respond to the mean voter position or to their support-
ers? Party Politics 17(3): 275–301.
Giebler H, Lacewell OP, Regel S, et al. (2015) Niedergang oder
Wandel? Parteitypen und die Krise der repra¨sentativen
Demokratie. In: Merkel W (ed.) Demokratie und Krise: Zum
schwierigen Verha¨ltnis von Theorie und Empirie. Wiesbaden:
Springer VS, pp. 181–219.
Lacewell 459
Haupt A (2010) Party responses to economic globalization: What
is left for the left and right for the right? Party Politics 16(1):
5–27.
Held D, McGrew A, Goldblatt D, et al. (1999) Global Transfor-
mations: Politics, Economics, Culture. Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press.
Hooghe L, Marks G and Wilson C (2002) Does left/right structure
party positions on European integration? Comparative Politi-
cal Studies 35(8): 965–989.
Ingelhart R (1977) The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and
Political Styles Among Western Publics. Princeton, NJ: Prin-
ceton University Press.
Jahn D and C Oberst (2012) Ideological party cohesion in macro-
comparative politics: The Nordic social democratic parties
from a comparative perspective. Scandinavian Political Stud-
ies 35(3): 222–245.
Katz RS and Mair P (1995) Changing models of party organiza-
tion and party democracy: The emergence of the cartel party.
Party Politics 1(1): 5–28.
Kirchheimer O (1965) Der Wandel des westeuropa¨ischen Par-
teiensystems. Politische Vierteljahresschrift 6(1): 20–41.
Kitschelt H (1995) The Radical Right in Western Europe: A Com-
parative Analysis. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan
Press.
Kitschelt H, Lange P, Marks G, et al. (1999) Continuity and
Change in Contemporary Capitalism. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Kluever H and JJ Spoon (2015) Who responds? Voters, parties,
and issue attention. British Journal of Political Science. DOI:
10.1017/S0007123414000313.
KOF (2013) 2013 KOF Index of Globalization. Available at:
http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch
Kriesi HP, Grande E, Lachat R, et al. (2008) West European Pol-
itics in the Age of Globalization. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press.
Kriesi HP, Grande E, Dolezal M, et al. (2012) Political Conflict in
Western Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lipset SM and Rokkan S (1967) Cleavage Structures, Party Sys-
tems, and Voter Alignments: An Introduction. New York: The
Free Press.
Mair P (1997) Party System Change: Approaches and Interpreta-
tions. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Mair P (2005) Cleavages. In: Katz RJ and Crotty WJ (eds)
The Handbook of Party Politics. London: Sage Publica-
tions, pp. 370–375.
Meguid B (2005) Competition between unequals: The role of
mainstream party strategy in niche party success. American
Political Science Review 99(3): 347–359.
Merkel W, Petring A, Henkes C, et al. (2008) Social Democracy in
Power: The Capacity to Reform. New York: Routledge Press.
Meyer T and M Wagner (2013) Mainstream or niche? Vote-
seeking incentives and the programmatic strategies of political
parties. Comparative Political Studies 46(10): 1246–1272.
Milner HV and Judkins B (2004) Partisanship, trade policy, and
globalization: Is there a left-right divide on trade policy? Inter-
national Studies Quarterly 48(1): 95–120.
Poguntke T (2014) Towards a new party system: The vanishing
hold of the catch-all parties in Germany. Party Politics
20(6): 950–963.
Przeworski A and Sprague J (1986) Paper Stones: A History of
Electoral Socialism. Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press.
Reiter HL (1989) Party decline in the West: A skeptic’s view.
Journal of Theoretical Politics 1(3): 325–348.
Rovny J (2012) Who emphasizes and who blurs? Party strategies
in multidimensional competition. European Union Politics
13(2): 269–292.
Schumacher G, de Vries C and Vis B (2013) Why do political
parties change their position? Institutional conditions and
environmental incentives. Journal of Politics 75(2): 464–
477.
van der Wardt M (2015) Desperate needs, desperate deeds: Why
mainstream parties respond to the issues of niche parties.West
European Politics 38(1): 93–122.
Volkens A, Lacewell OP, Lehmann P, et al. (2012) The Manifesto
Data Collection, Manifesto Project (MRG/CMP/MARPOR).
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin fu¨r Sozialforschung. Available
at: www.manifesto-project.wzb.eu
Wagner M (2012) When do parties emphasise extreme positions?
How strategic incentives for policy differentiation influence
issue importance. European Journal of Political Research
51(1): 64–88.
Ward H, Ezrow L and Dorussen H (2011) Globalization, party
positions, and the median voter. World Politics 63(3): 509–
547.
Ward D, Kim JH, GrahamM, et al. (2015) How economic integra-
tion affects party issue emphasis. Comparative Political Stud-
ies. DOI: 10.1177/001041405576745.
Werner A, Lacewell OP and Volkens A (2011) Manifesto Coding
Handbook. 4th edition. Available at: www.manifesto-project.
wzb.eu
Weßels B (2001) Die ‘‘Dritten Wege’’: Eine Modernisierung
sozial-demokratischer Politikkonzepte? In: Schroeder W (ed.)
Neue Balance zwischen Markt und Staat? Schwaibach am
Taunus: Wochenschau Verlag, pp. 43–64.
Author biography
Onawa Promise Lacewell is a research fellow at the WZB Berlin
Social Science Center in the Department of Democracy and
Democratization.
460 Party Politics 23(4)
